PARTIES AND POLITICIANS
IN CONTEMPORARY PERU:

EXPLORING NEW FORMS
OF ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION

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Introduction

The 1995 cross-national study of Latin American party systems edited by Mainwaring and Scully confirmed what long-time observers of Peruvian politics have known to be true: the Peruvian political party system is in disarray. Historically, it was neither stable nor particularly well-institutionalized. In the post-transition democracy of the 1980's, a nascent party system with stable class-based voting patterns appeared to be emerging. In the 1990's however, that emerging party system has disintegrated, and the current governing =party= is so loosely-organized as to call into question the suitability of the term.

Is the political organization of President Alberto Fujimori a political party in any meaningful sense of the word, or is it instead an example of a new organizational form for electoral competition? In this paper, I will examine the case for conceptualizing the current ruling party as an =electoral movement=, a form of organizing for the contestation of elections that is distinct from a political party. First, I will summarize the history of political parties in Peru. Second, I will make a theoretical case for conceptually separating political parties from other electorally-competitive organizational forms. Third, I will explore the hypothesis that politicians from the ruling electoral movement are substantively different than politicians in other political parties. I will compare two approaches to the relationship between parties and politicians, in order to demonstrate that analyzing legislators might be a good =first cut= at this research problem.

Finally, in performing some exploratory data analysis, I will suggest that there are both similarities and differences, some expected and some unexpected, between the Fujimoristas and other congressional politicians.

A History of Peruvian Party Politics

Oligarches and Modernizers: 1895-1968

At the turn of the century, Peruvian politics was dominated by a heterogeneous array of regionally-based groups of oligarchs and the proto-parties (more accurately described as elite caucuses) that represented them. In 1919, a series of strikes and popular protests provoked a military intervention that initiated an eleven year period of rule by Augusto Leguía, who was viewed by many moderates and radicals as a much-needed political and economic =modernizer=. He was also supported by the nascent groups led by Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre and José Carlos Mariátegui that would, in the 1920's, coalesce into the populist Alianza Popular Revolucionaria

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1In the time line presented in Appendix I, I depict the historical development of the Peruvian party system. For each period, I represent the major parties and coalitions active in the political system. I attempt to distribute them roughly along a right-left ideological spectrum. However, in many cases this effort is confounded by drastic shifts in policies and ideological stances within the periods that I demarcate and, even more problematic, the ideologically inchoate nature of the parties themselves. Furthermore, this time line does not include each and every party that existed during this century; rather I chose the parties that were influential, that enjoyed reasonably wide support, and that existed (in whole or in part) beyond a single electoral contest.
Americana (APRA) and the Socialist (later Communist) Party of Peru, respectively (Collier and Collier 1991).

In 1930, Leguía was overthrown and, one month later, APRA was organized as an official political party. Throughout the 1930's, APRA grew in strength and was severely repressed by the oligarchic regime led by General Oscar Benavides. This experience of repression became central to the identity of APRistas and created a cleavage that would divide Peruvian politics for much of this century. The 1940's was a period of increased political clout for the APRA; between 1939 and 1945, it was incorporated into the political system by President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, and from 1945 to 1948 the APRA actually ruled in a coalition government with a regionally-based party and the Communists.

However, a 1948 conservative coup by General Manuel Odría ended this period of elite toleration of APRA, and for the next eight years the governing regime repressed APRistas and, at the same time, implemented a wide range of populist policies. Semi-competitive electoralism returned to Peru in 1956 with the Pact of Monterrico, which implemented a political compromise among oligarchs, modernizing elites, and the APRA -- which was again allowed to participate, in exchange for limiting its popular mobilization. The period between 1956 and 1962 also saw the introduction of new political parties such as the centre-right Acción Popular (AP) and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), which competed for the political support of newly mobilized forces such as the peasantry, a group that the APRA largely neglected (Collier and Collier 1991).

Social conflict and anti-oligarchic mobilization nonetheless accelerated in both urban and rural areas, and in 1962 a military coup attempted to mitigate these demands from below with reforms from above; the military regime ruled for one year, then supported the candidacy of moderate reformist Fernando Belaúnde Terry, the personalistic leader of the AP. This compromise did not stave off further conflict and elite fears of popular mobilization; ironically, however, it was the absence of an effective reformist block, rather than the threat of radical change from a then-conservative APRA, that was the major cause of the 1968 military coup that brought General Juan Velasco Alvarado to power.

Summarizing the pre-1968 period, several salient points emerge. First, most of the political parties in this period were elite rather than mass-based, and most were highly personalistic in nature. Second, the party system was highly volatile, with numerous splits occurring among the parties, particularly in the 1960's (see Appendix I). Third, the severe repression of the APRA created a fundamental divide in Peruvian politics and stifled the emergence of other competitive reformist parties, with the AP as a partial exception (Hilliker 1971). Moreover, the fact that APRA inclusion in governing coalitions was made possible by abandoning its programme and moving towards conservatism explains the ideologically inchoate nature of Peru's most institutionalized party, as well as the absence of representation for popular sectors (Collier and Collier 1991; Graham 1992). Fourth, the repeated pattern of military veto throughout the middle third of this century, whenever popular sectors threatened to gain too much power both within and outside of formal party politics, contributed to the weakness of the party system itself. Finally, it is apparent that political power in Peru has traditionally been highly centralized, under democratic as well as authoritarian regimes.

The effects of the military regime (1968-1980) on society substantially altered the political arena of the electoral regime which followed it. The Velasquista attempt at reform from above created a populace that was politically mobilized (albeit in a top-down fashion) and carved out a greatly increased economic role for the state (Stokes 1995; Cotler 1986). By the late 1970's, after a conservative counter-coup had ousted Velasco, the military began extricating itself from politics. In 1978 a Constituent Assembly was elected, with the APRA and the right-wing Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC) combining to win a majority, and a variety of small leftist parties combining for a one-third share of seats. Among the significant features of the 1979 Constitution that emerged from this Assembly was the drastic expansion of suffrage due to the inclusion of non-literate Peruvians. Elections held in 1980 resulted in Belaúnde of the AP winning the presidency again, and the AP and PPC combining to form a right-leaning coalition in the legislature. From 1980 to 1983, Belaúnde attempted to implement a stabilization programme. This neoliberal project was subsequently abandoned, and from 1983 to 1985 a fragmented and inconsistently implemented heterodox programme of fiscal austerity and demand stimulation was attempted, with unsuccessful results. The 1983 municipal elections saw the AP lose many positions to the leftist coalition, the Izquierda Unida (IU), including the mayorality of Lima. In 1985, Alan García Pérez of the APRA was elected president, backed by a populist, multiclass coalition; García attempted a heterodox economic programme that isolated Peru from the international financial community and led to the near-collapse of the state. While the economy grew marginally from 1985 to 1987, it contracted by 8.4% in 1988, and by 11.4% in 1989 (Conaghan and Malloy 1994). This economic crisis was accompanied by sociopolitical unrest, namely the expansion of guerilla campaigns on the part of the Sendero Luminoso and the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru.

Another facet of politics in the 1980's was the gap between the purported and actual power of the legislative branch of government. Although the 1979 constitution gave the legislature a significant role in policy making, it also included easily-invoked provisions for presidential rule by decree. As such, presidents (and their advisers) increasingly marginalized the Congress throughout the 1980's. Congress was filled with sound and fury in this decade, and was the site of many politically rancorous debates but, in the final analysis, the ability of these legislators to have an impact on the policy process was sporadic at best.

Despite this atmosphere of crisis and the weakness of the legislative branch, one of the most noteworthy aspects of party politics in the 1980's was the relatively stable social bases of political parties, or at the very least, the stability of class-based patterns of voting. As depicted in Cameron (1994), ecological correlations between class categories and electoral support for left-wing and right-wing parties was extremely strong between 1978 and 1989, even among the extremely heterogeneous informal sector. There is some evidence for class-based voting in 1990 as well, with the left-right split being replicated by Fujimori's and Vargas Llosa's respective

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2Many rural regions, especially in the highlands, were no longer under the effective control of the state. In the late-1980's, the Sendero Luminoso also began expanding successfully into the urban slums of (or *pueblos jóvenes*) of Lima.
organizations (see below). During the 1990’s, however, these stable social bases of support for political parties rapidly disintegrated and with them, the party system itself.

Neoliberal Reform and the Rise of Outsider Candidates: the 1990’s

In the 1990 elections, an internally divided left performed poorly, as did the APRA. A runoff for the presidency pitted the novelist Mario Vargas Llosa, representing a new right-wing coalition of the PPC, AP, and Libertad (Frente Democrático, or FREDEMO) supported by the urban elite, against Alberto Fujimori, a politically-unknown former university rector who, in the months preceding the election, created a makeshift organization called Cambio-90 (C-90). Vargas Llosa was a staunch and vocal advocate of neoliberal shock therapy for Peru, whereas Fujimori campaigned on a promise of no shock, without any clear ideological programme or package of economic reforms. Fujimori won the election in the second round of balloting, and the institutional coalition that served as his party was soon severed from any effective role in governance. Neither his running mates nor the C-90 legislators in Congress were included in the ensuing policy-making process. However, despite the marginalization of legislators and C-90's minority status, Fujimori was able to temporarily secure the quiescence of the Congress and attain discretionary executive powers, in part by entering into a coalition with right-wing parties in Congress (Roberts 1995; Palmer 1996).

Fujimori quickly implemented economic austerity policies that were even more severe than those proposed by his chief rival for the presidency. The short- to medium-term impact upon the distribution of real income was highly regressive. As price supports, tariffs, and industrial subsidies were eliminated, prices rose dramatically, and bread riots were limited largely through the use of military force. On August 7, 1990, tanks rolled into the streets of Lima in preparation for the announcement of the shock (see Stokes 1997).

Fujimori also accelerated his use of the politics of antipolitics discourse, demonizing political parties, state institutions, career politicians, interest groups and trade unions, and holding them responsible for the country’s problems. Conversely, the organized coalition of support for Fujimori included neoliberal civilian technocrats, some business elites and informal sector groups, the military and, indirectly, international lenders.

In late 1991, having already implemented major economic stabilization measures and having successfully curbed hyperinflation, Fujimori attempted to enact by decree a package of 120 new laws pertaining to a deepening of structural economic reform and an expansion of power for the military. By February 1992, most of these decrees had been reversed by congressional legislation. Publicly blaming the corrupt political class for blocking his reforms on April 5, 1992, Fujimori dissolved the legislature, dismissed much of the judiciary (including the Supreme Court),

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3The price of gasoline rose by 3,140% the price of kerosene, used as cooking fuel by poor consumers, by 6,964%; bread prices rose by 1,567%, cooking oil by 639%, sugar by 552%, and rice by 533%; prices for medicine increased, on average, by 1,385%.

4Ironically, the president’s technocratic practices subsequently held business groups at arms length, and the military was partially purged and staffed with supporters of the president.
and suspended the 1979 Constitution. The military was called in to control protesting crowds. However, data from polls taken soon after the coup demonstrated broad support for Fujimori, particularly among the urban poor.

Elections for a new Democratic Constituent Congress were held in late 1992, but were boycotted by several major parties. A majority of seats was won by Fujimori's loosely-knit electoral movement, which was reformulated as Nueva Mayoria - Cambio 90. This assembly temporarily re-ratified the 1979 Constitution, but all previously issued emergency decrees were upheld. In 1993 a national plebiscite on a new constitution drafted by the Democratic Constituent Congress was held, along with municipal elections. The new constitution was narrowly passed, and among other changes, it allowed presidents to seek immediate reelection to a second term of office (Cameron 1994). In April 1995, Fujimori was reelected by a wide margin; not one organized political party attained the 5% of the vote required to maintain official party status (Kay 1995).

The growing volatility and absence of ideological cohesion within the electorate further supports the assertion that the nascent stability that party politics exhibited in the 1980's has disintegrated. According to a November, 1991 survey, fully 53% of all respondents claimed not to know the terms Left and Right in politics; among the poorest sectors of Peruvians, this figure was as high as 71% (Cameron 1994). Although self-identification is not necessarily a good indicator of ideology, it is nonetheless striking that so few people claimed to recognize these labels of political ideology. Moreover, when asked about their level of trust in parties and in the institution of Congress in particular, Peruvians across class and regional boundaries are more disdainful of party politics than the citizens of virtually any other Latin American country (Lagos 1996). Party identification, which never approached the levels of European democracies or the more entrenched Latin American party systems such as Chile, has dropped further in the 1990's (see Franco 1991). Thus, the emergence and success of electoral movements as non-institutionalized, non-ideological vehicles for contesting elections, might also be seen as a rejection of programmatic political parties and their ideologies, across the political spectrum.

At present, there does not seem to be any reversal of the trend towards the decline of organized political parties and, with them, the Peruvian party system. Most of the existing parties continue to decline in popularity, and there is a dearth of political projects to create institutionalized parties among both existing political elites and organizations within civil society. The institutional form that has proven most successful in recent years has been a loose grouping of electoral candidates under the rubric of a personalistic leader (Perelli et al 1995). I refer to this

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5This support increased greatly in September 1992, when a police intelligence unit captured the leader of the Sendero Luminoso and seized the organization's computer files, thus legitimating the coup and the conditions of restricted liberty under which Peruvians were living (see Palmer 1996).

6Furthermore, the military, which had been relatively apolitical during the 1980's, openly supported the president in his bid for reelection. This may be viewed as quid pro quo for Fujimori's increased use of, and support for, military and intelligence services, as well as the expansion of the counterinsurgency campaign and the organization of armed civilian defense groups in both urban and rural areas.
type of organization as an electoral movement, a term which I examine in the next section of this essay.

The first noteworthy post-transition example of an outsider politician achieving electoral success in Peru was the candidacy of Ricardo Belmont, the telecommunications entrepreneur and television talk-show host who was elected mayor of Lima in 1989. His electoral movement, Obras (Works), attracted centrist voters from a range of social classes by campaigning on a non-ideological platform. As I have described above, Fujimori’s C90-NM movement employed a similar strategy, as did former UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuellar’s Unión por el Perú (UPP) in 1995. Another successful so-called independent is Alberto Andrade, the former mayor of the affluent Lima suburb of Miraflores and the current mayor of metropolitan Lima. Andrade won the mayorality of Lima by successfully using this same formula, managing to overcome the taint of his obviously being a seasoned party politician. Despite having extensive networks and resources, the mayor has not organized his movement into an institutionalized political party. Since July of 1997, Alberto Andrade has been insinuating his intention to run for president in the year 2000, and his organizational structure shows no signs of being transformed into a more institutionalized party.

In sum, traditional parties in the contemporary Peruvian political system are organizationally weakened, distrusted by the public, and shunned by voters. The ruling party serves little purpose other than mobilizing at election time and supporting the President in Congress. Although C90-NM has also contested elections at the municipal level, there appears to be little role for the party in coordinating policy-making across the legislative and executive branches, let alone from the national to the municipal levels of government. As such, I refer to it as an electoral movement rather than a political party.

**Conceptualizing Political Parties**

The definition of the term political party has not been bereft of disagreement among political scientists. For example, Giovanni Sartori (1976) employs a minimalist definition of parties: a party is any political group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office. A more nuanced definition of parties is that of Kay Lawson (1980, 1988), who emphasizes the linkages between state and society that parties provide. Parties can offer citizens the opportunity to participate in government and promote the responsiveness of government to voters, but can also be used for clientelistic favoritism or coercive control. Although not all of these manifestations of linkage are necessarily democratic in nature, they all nonetheless institutionalize the state-society relationship. For the purposes of this paper, I will refer to parties as those organizations that contest elections and embody some form of linkage with society.

Several scholars have formulated ideal-typical sub-categories of political parties. Duverger (1954) observed the rise of mass bureaucratic parties in Western Europe -- parties with origins in social movements, strong vertical ties to its membership, affiliation with intermediary organizations, and an emphasis on ideology. Duverger believed that the US electorally-oriented
parties were \textit{backwards} and might one day \textit{develop} into class-oriented mass parties. Kirchheimer (1966) disagreed, and predicted a teleological progression from class- (and religion) based parties to catch-all parties -- less ideological, less organizationally cohesive, more heterogeneous, and more electorally-oriented -- as in the US. Extending this argument, Panebianco (1988) emphasizes the professionalization of parties, the weakening of vertical ties with society, and their appeal to public opinion rather than ideology or membership.

While the transformation of parties is a rather ubiquitous phenomenon, the differences in degree between these European and North American electorally-oriented parties and electoral movements such as C90-NM are, I argue, so great as to constitute a difference in kind. The distinction that I draw between political parties and electoral movements is based on three sets of criteria. First, they differ in terms of organizational complexity; in addition to horizontal linkages across branches of government, parties will have more layers of bureaucracy, more sophisticated structure, more internal rules, and larger paid staffs than electoral movements. Second, parties will have reasonably stable and well-defined political positions, at least somewhat distinct from the persona of the party leader. Third, parties will embody greater vertical linkages to society, indicated by party membership, party identification among citizens, ties to intermediary groups, and/or affective ties among individual members.

One might also ask how the current manifestation of poorly institutionalized parties differ from the highly personalistic parties that dominated Peruvian politics throughout much of this century. I would argue that the electoral movements of the 1990's differ from previous examples of non-institutionalized parties for several reasons. First, far broader suffrage since 1978 has vastly increased the size of the electorate. Second, the advent of new technologies in communications and polling has allowed political entrepreneurs to gather and disseminate information with less reliance upon organizations, formal or informal (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Conaghan 1994). Finally, the economic crisis and subsequent reforms weakened the basis for the clientelistic politics practiced by existing parties. In an environment in which economic informality is increasing and individual citizens social identities are in flux, the opportunities for gaining electoral support are less constrained by class structures and patronage networks (Cameron 1994).

In evaluating the usefulness of the concept of the electoral movement in the Peruvian context, one must first enquire whether the social phenomenon to which it refers is sufficiently distinct (from political parties) to merit a separate analytic category. Are parties and electoral movements truly different? In the sections that follow, I attempt a \textit{first cut} at answering this question by analyzing the backgrounds of the legislators affiliated with parties and electoral movement. For reasons that I will explore below, we should be able to detect some differences between C90-NM and other parties by examining the politicians who were chosen to run as their congressional candidates.

\textit{Theories of Recruitment and Aspiration: aggregate vs individual levels of analysis}

Attempts at conceptualizing and analyzing the relationship between politicians and parties can generally be categorized into two sets of approaches. Although actual methodologies
adopted by researchers frequently straddle the two sides of this divide, the main dimension upon which they differ is no less than the ontological starting point for conceptualizing political parties.

One set of approaches takes the existence of a party organization as its starting point, and inquires as to the recruitment strategies and opportunity structures with which politicians are confronted (Norris 1997; Lasswell 1952; Eulau and Czudnowski 1976). Viewed through this lens, the party (through its selectors exerts demand for politicians, and would-be candidates represent a supply of aspirants. The opportunities for advancement, the process of recruiting candidates, and the decision-making power of gatekeepers within the party all structure the way that politicians enter the world of electoral competition. The background, values and qualities of the politicians are relevant variables, as is the position of the aspirant within the party organization.

Such an approach is compatible with theories of national party systems that begin their explanation in the realm of society, specifically the social cleavages such as class, region and religion that divide national polities. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) explain Western European party systems as the product of historical cleavages (class, religion, region) that became institutionalized in distinct ways in different national contexts. In Europe during this century, it is the class cleavage that has been most stable. Moreover, as Kirchheimer (1966) notes, organized working class interests played a crucial role in institutionalizing party systems; as the working class formed mass-based parties, other groups were pressured into doing so in order to compete electorally.

What this theory shares with theories of recruitment is the assumption that parties, which were initially institutionalized to represent groups within society, and which exist as coherent organizations with rules, norms and procedures, are logically prior to the aspirations and career paths of individual politicians.

The other set of approaches takes the aspirations and strategic behavior of political elites as its starting point, and suggests that parties are merely the organizational vehicle for office-seeking politicians to achieve their goals. In Anthony Downs` influential model of party competition, the party is a team seeking to control the governing apparatus by gaining office (Downs 1957, p. 25). In this view, parties formulate policies to win elections, rather than win elections to formulate policies or represent groups within society. In another variation, the ambition theory of Joseph Schlesinger and its more recently formulated corollaries, the self-interested ambitions of competitive politicians can, under certain conditions, lead them to form or join political parties.

Robert Dix (1989) has argued that in Latin America class-mass parties and ideological party systems never emerged -- Chile being a notable exception. Universal male suffrage and incorporation of middle and working classes did not result in class-mass parties, as in Europe, but rather catch-all parties: pragmatic, multi-class, often populist, appealing to nationhood and vague notions of progress and development. Moreover, the process that Kirchheimer (1966) depicts was also absent in Latin America. The cooptation of the APRA in the middle part of this century adds to an explanation of this phenomenon in the Peruvian case. Collier and Collier (1991) further elaborate on the influence of different modes of incorporation of working classes on subsequent political development in different Latin American countries.
Thus, an explanation for the emergence of political parties based on individual level factors (i.e. competitive elites) stands the social cleavage explanation on its head: in this view, parties emerged to facilitate the goal-seeking of politicians. The most prominent example of such an explanation is that of John Aldrich (1995), whose account of the historical development of the American party system is meant to illustrate a rational-choice theory for the existence of parties. Although his approach is more heterodox than Downs and Schlesinger in that it admits that elected office may be only one of several goals of politicians, it nonetheless takes individual elites competing for power as the cause of party formation. For Aldrich, parties are created in order to solve problems of inefficient competition, collective decision-making and, in particular, collective action among politicians. Parties as institutions can, perhaps, exist beyond the immediate functional needs that they serve and thus outlive his causal explanation, yet Aldrich also notes that politicians may turn to other vehicles for contesting elections if parties are no longer useful.

It is not surprising that the contributors to the social cleavage literature have tended to look to European political systems, with their twentieth century histories of class-based mass political parties, for evidence to support their claims. Likewise, it is not unusual that writers positing individual level explanations have based their arguments on the US case, in which we historically find a two party system, weaker party identification among voters and a paucity of class-based party politics.

The Peruvian case has elements that resonate with both sets of theories. The nascent institutionalization of political parties in the 1980's rapidly disintegrated in the late 80's and early 90's. A social cleavage explanation for parties and party systems would suggest that changes in society were the cause: changes in class structure, particularly the increased informalization of the economy, the weakening of organized labour and other sectors of civil society, as well as the reduction of the role of the state in economic redistribution (see, for example, Cameron 1994; Balbi 1997; Tanaka 1997). Alternately, an individual level explanation would suggest that the costs and benefits of contesting elections through parties changed for politicians, such that quasi-party forms, or electoral movements, were the resulting organizational vehicle of choice for many. For such an explanation to be complete, we would need to know what, exactly, rationally egoistic politicians wish to maximize while being elected would seem to be the most obvious reason to affiliate with the Fujimorista party. Such an assumption then begs the question of what, exactly, these politicians gain from their offices. In a Congress that is weak by constitutional design and by the practices of the President and his advisers, in an electoral movement that is largely excluded from policy-making and is expected to serve as a mouthpiece of the President in Congress, what do legislators gain from their victory? A rational choice answer would need to specify this explicitly.

Moreover, the process by which candidates were selected by the President party for the most recent round of congressional elections is also suggestive of an approach in which party organizations, not the political aspirations of legislators, is the starting point. Advisers to the president accepted approximately 1,000 applications from potential candidates, and screened them based on their credentials and their attributes. Using public opinion surveys, focus groups, and a consulting psychologist, individuals with negative images were discarded from the pool of aspirants; one of the criteria for selecting a candidate, ironically, was that he or she be apolitical.
On the basis of this selection process, seventeen sitting deputies in what was then the Constituent Assembly were refused places on the congressional ballots in 1995 (Conaghan 1996).

In either case, we should expect to see some differences between the congressional politicians of political parties and those of the C90-NM electoral movement. If we assume that politicians enter election races based on their recruitment by organized interests, then we might see evidence of the different qualities, experiences, and networks that organizational selectors seek. If we instead adopt the view that parties are the product of ambitious goal-seeking politicians, then we might see evidence of the different payoff structures--different costs and benefits associated with their choice of electoral vehicle -- for party and electoral movement politicians.

**Exploratory Results**

In order to explore and evaluate the hypothesis that politicians in the governing party are somehow different from those of traditional parties, I used data from the 1995 Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA) survey conducted in Peru. 87 of the 120 members of the currently sitting Congress were interviewed, approximately six months after they took office. Although the survey explores a wide range of attitudes and beliefs, I focussed on the questions regarding the backgrounds of the politicians, since these responses refer to attributes that were certain to have pre-dated their entry into politics, were less subject to short-term change, and were more difficult to misrepresent (willfully or subconsciously). The factors of interest to me include education, region, class, family history, and past political activity. I selected these factors based not only on the theories explored above, but also on the claims made by C90-NM in distancing themselves from parties. In terms of recruitment or aspiration theories, I thought it important to examine these fundamental aspects of the politicians’ background. Ideally, other kinds of information (e.g. racial self-identification) would have been useful as well, but within the limitations of the survey instrument, these seemed most relevant to both theoretical approaches. In terms of the rhetoric of Fujimorismo, the claims of C90-NM to be representative of the common people, a political network of small entrepreneurs, and an apolitical or anti-political organization, also directed my choice of variables.

The statistical methodology that I employed in exploring this data is a binary logit model. I begin the discussion of my results with a caveat regarding the size of the sample and the reliability of the results. Logit modeling uses Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) to generate parameter estimates and other measures. MLE is asymptotically efficient, meaning that the larger the sample size, the more reliable the results. Some general guidelines for utilizing MLE and logit models have suggested that only samples of more than 100 cases be analyzed (Long 1997), while

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8I also believed that career history would have been of interest as a variable, particularly the presence of small entrepreneurs in C90-NM, since this is a group that they claim to represent. However, there are very few legislators with this career background; the most common previous careers among politicians of all parties are in teaching, law, or large businesses.
others will allow smaller sample sizes as long as the average cell size is at least five and that any zero cells (combinations of values to which no cases correspond) are not distributed in a skewed manner (DeMaris 1992). Moreover, any bias that results from a small sample will be detectable in the discrepancy between the Likelihood Ratio Chi-square (i.e. G-square) and the Pearson Chi-square; this discrepancy is not significantly large for any of the models that I discuss below. In sum, I argue that the results that I present below should be taken, at minimum, as a reliable first cut at the data, useful for generating future research, despite the small size of the sample.

The dependent variable, for all models tested, was whether the legislator in question was in the governing C90-NM party or not. Although not all of the other parties are well institutionalized, for the sake of parsimony I did not attempt to make finer distinctions among them. As for independent variables, some are taken directly from questions in the survey whereas others are combinations of survey questions. The explanatory variables to which I will refer are as follows:

Region - In which department of Peru did the legislator reside before being elected? I contrast those who originated in Lima with those who resided in other regions.

Class (1) - In which social class would the politician locate his/her family? I collapsed upper-middle, and lower-middle, creating a crude measure of the individual's self-identified class background.

Class (2) - Did the legislator attend a private or a public university? All of the interviewees had at least some university education; however, the type of institution gives us additional information about the socioeconomic status of the politician. Also, this measure is less subjective than the self-identification variable described above.

Family History - Was someone in the interviewee's family involved in politics before they were?

Political Commitment - Was the politician involved in politics prior to her/his election to the Congress? If the date that s/he cited for becoming politically active was more than a year before they were elected, then they are coded as committed, otherwise, they are not.

In any given model, I attempt to test only a small number of variables. According to the requirements stated above, only models with three or fewer independent variables should be considered reliable. For the sake of exploring the data, I am including models with up to five explanatory variables; the discrepancies between G-square and Chi-square are not significant in any of the models, so this breach seems acceptable.

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9This is sample size divided by number of cells, with number of cells being the number of possible combinations of values for all the variables.

10Since the number of legislators from any one of the parties is certain to be small, I do not feel that this operationalization presents a great threat of biasing my results.
Note also that I am only testing the main effects of the variables, rather than interactions among them. A priori, I had no theoretical basis for assuming that any of the explanatory variables effects on the dependent variable are mediated through any other variable. One pair that I suspected were the two class-related variables, but inserting an interaction term did not improve the results vis-a-vis the saturated model (i.e. the one that includes all possible interactions among variables). Most importantly, the G-squares for all the models presented below are insignificant; that is, the results are for any one model are not significantly different from the saturated model with those particular variables.

My results may be summarized as follows:

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<th>VARIABLES</th>
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<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
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<td>-0.76</td>
<td>-1.02*</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
<td>-0.57</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>-1.04*</td>
<td>-1.57**</td>
<td>-1.38**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>-1.76**</td>
<td>-1.74**</td>
<td>-1.77**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = significant at .1 level ** = significant at .05 level

**Discussion and Interpretation**

In this case, variables that were excluded from the models or produced insignificant results are as theoretically interesting as those with significant parameters. In selecting the variables that I tested from the larger set of those with implications that were interesting to this research project, I performed simple correlations between the dependent variable (party affiliation) and a number of independent variables. Although these untested observations may be the product of spurious correlation and require additional testing, several tentative points may be made. First, there was very little variance in terms of educational levels; all legislators had at least some university education, and there was no significant relationship between postgraduate education and party affiliation. Second, there was very little variation in reported participation in civil

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**11**The concentration of a model is a measure of the amount of the variance in the dependent variable that is explained the independent variables -- akin to an R-square measure for an OLS regression.

**12**Although I did not include it above, I tested a model with postgraduate education, family history in politics and career commitment to politics as independent variables. The parameter estimate for the impact of postgraduate education on party affiliation was highly insignificant.
society. All legislators claim to be involved in some sort of association, and moreover, there were no discernible patterns in politicians' participation in labour or neighbourhood associations. Thus, a relationship that I had expected between traditional party politicians (on the left, at least) and activists in labour and neighbourhood organizations did not materialize (see Stokes 1995).

Turning to the variables tested in the five models depicted above, several additional findings emerge. First, there does not appear to be a highly significant relationship between the regional origins of the politician (the capital vs the provinces) and her/his party affiliation. Although I had imagined that the centralized power structure of C90-NM would create a bias towards candidates from the capital, the sign of the parameter is in fact the opposite of what I had expected; the ruling party had proportionally more legislators of provincial origin, although this relationship was not strong. Second, class background proved to be a weakly significant or insignificant predictor regardless of which measure was used; self-identification was a more significant measure than educational institution, although its less dependable operationalization casts doubt on even the weak significance of this variable.

The variables that did produce highly significant results across several different models were family political history and a career commitment to politics. Converting the parameter estimates into odds ratios, as logit modeling allows us to do, we see in Model 3, for example, that the odds of a politician who had a politically active family member being in a party other than C90-NM were almost six times as great as those who did not have a politically active family member. Similarly, the odds of a legislator who had a career commitment to politics (and became politically active prior to seeking office) being in a party other than C90-NM were almost five times as great as those who did not have a career commitment to politics. Both of these findings are consistent with the screening criteria for candidacy in C90-NM: that the candidate be apolitical. It is conceivable, in a rational-choice version of this story, that being political put aspiring candidates at a disadvantage in seeking office through Fujimori's party since they could not credibly commit to this new organization. This is bolstered by the fact that, unlike Brazil and other countries with mostly weak parties, relatively little party switching goes on among Peruvian politicians. However, it is hard to imagine how having a family history in politics alters an aspiring candidate's material gains from one organizing strategy over another; the evidence seems to tilt away from a purely rational choice approach.

CONCLUSIONS

Although political parties in Peru have never been particularly well-institutionalized, it appears that the party system, which appeared to be stabilizing during the 1980's, has grown increasingly inchoate during the 1990's. The parties that have enjoyed the greatest electoral success are, in fact, loosely-organized ad hoc groups. In this paper, I have argued for a definition of political parties that specifies those organizations that appear to link politicians to society and to each other, across branches of government. Those organizations that contest elections but do

\[ \text{odds ratio} = e^{\beta} \]
not serve either of these functions I have labeled electoral movements. Furthermore, I have examined two contesting conceptualizations of the relationship between parties and politicians, and suggested that, regardless of which conceptualization one accepts, we should expect to see some variation between the candidates and politicians of parties on the one hand, and electoral movements such as C90-NM on the other. Finally, I have presented preliminary evidence for these similarities and differences, and shown that family history and a career commitment to politics appear to be the most salient divide among those currently serving in Congress. The C90-NM politicians are, indeed, more apolitical than their colleagues in other parties.

The demise of Peru’s party system in the 1990s does not bode well for the prospects of consolidating democracy in that country. Peru is an extreme yet illustrative example of a much-debated trend in new democracies in Latin America and Eastern Europe: delegative democracy, or the combination of democratic electoral mechanisms with authoritarian political practices and institutional structures (O’Donnell 1994). As suggested above, the decline of political parties is, arguably, a widespread phenomenon, and even the 1992 autogolpe of President Fujimori, has had its parallels in Russia, Guatemala, and elsewhere. It is my hope that, by better understanding the micro-level logic of an extreme case of party system disintegration, we might also understand a larger set of less extreme yet troubling numerous cases.
APPENDIX I: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERUVIAN PARTY SYSTEMS

1895-1919
Civilistas/Democrats/Constitutionalists/Liberals
(oligarchic, regionally-based parties; Civilistas dominant)

1919-1930
Leguía

1930-1939
APRA (outside system) Oligarchic (Genera Benavides, etc.)

1939-1945
Prado/MDP (incorporation of APRA into system)

1945-1948
FDN (regional party + APRA + Communists) Oligarchic

1948-1956
Odría/UNO (repression of APRA, but populist policies)

1956-1962
APRA AP PDC MDP UNO
(APRA-MDP alliance; parties competing for support of lower and middle sectors)

1962-1968
AP/Carlista(split) MDP APRA PDC/PPC(split) UNO
(shifting alliances; splintering of parties; military vetoes of elections; APRA moves right)

1968-1980
Military (Velasco, Morales)
1978-1980 (Constituent Assembly)

1980-1987
IU APRA AP PPC

1987-1990*
IS (split) IU APRA C-90/NM FREDEMO (AP, PPC, Libertad)
(left splits; right coalition under Vargas Llosa; increasing dealignment; independents≠

AP - Acción Popular MDP - Movmto. Democrático Pradista/Peruano
APRA - Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana PDC - Partido Demócrata Cristiano
C-90/NM - Cambio-90 / Nueva Mayoria PPC - Partido Popular Cristiano
FDN - Frente Democrático Nacional UNO - Unión Nacional Odríista
FREDEMO - Frente Democrático
FNTC - Frente Nac. de Trab. y Camp. *Although there was no change in executive in 1987,
IU - Izquierda Unida I have periodized it separately to illustrate the split among
IS - Izquierda Socialista leftist parties in that year, which altered the political spectrum.


